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КУРДСКИЙ ДЖАМААТ МЕНЗИЛЬ 
И ТУРЕЦКИЙ НАЦИОНАЛИЗМ: 
ПАРАДОКСЫ ВНУТРЕННЕЙ 
ПОЛИТИКИ ТУРЦИИ В ОБЛАСТИ 
КУЛЬТУРЫ И РЕЛИГИИ*
В этой статье автор выделяет ряд вопросов, касающихся полити-
ческих аспектов деятельности общины Мензиль в Турции. Он про-
слеживает духовную генеалогию и историю происхождения джама-
ата Мензиль, а также изучает его рост во времена шейха М. Эрола 
и его нынешнее состояние. Также рассмотрены актуальные про-
блемы отношений власти и джамаатов в нынешней повестке дня 
Турции.
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O f the major Muslim communities in Turkey, one of the most interesting is a commu-nity of people that aligns itself with Abdulbaki Erol and the religious and pilgrimage center in Menzil (a village in the district of Kahta, Adıyaman Province), whose name 
has become part of their self-identification. This fraternity, which follows the Naqshbandi 
tradition, is notable for the number of its members/participants, 
religious practices, political stances, and social orientation toward 
attracting people with deviant behavior, among many other things. 
At the same time, this community (jama’at1) is not an exception from 
the overall picture; its development has been shaped in many ways 
by the trend of the modernization of Turkish Muslim communities 
in the republican period and the adaptation of Muslims to the new 
conditions of the national secular state.
HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF THE COMMUNITY
A ccording to the Konsensus (social research company), the number of followers in the Menzil community in 2011 numbered more than 700,000 people (Yildirim, 2016, December 1). According to this data, the Menzils shared second place with 
the followers of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan for largest Muslim community in Turkey, while 
those of Fethullah Gülen held first place by a large margin. Some members of the Menzil 
* The paper was prepared in the framework of the fundamental research program «Culturally complex societies: 
understanding and management» supported by the Presidium of Russian Academy of Sciences.
1. In this article, the terms tarikat and jama’at are used interchangeably. Despite some differences, they are used both by the 
followers of religious leaders and by researchers for today’s Turkish Muslim communities with common ideology and/
or charismatic leader.
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In this paper, the author attempts to outline a number of issues concern-
ing political aspects of the Menzil community’s activities in Turkey. He also 
examines the actual problems of interconnections between authorities and 
Turkish jama’ats in Turkey’s current agenda. He traces back the spiritual ge-
nealogy and history of origin of the jama’at, as well as studies its growth at 
the times of Sheikh M. Erol and its current condition.
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community are confident that their jama’at is the most numerous (Harmanci, 2013, December 
19). Sociological statistics are objective to a degree, but even they can hardly provide the 
exact values. By general estimate, the community most likely has hundreds of thousands 
of followers, but not all of them are involved in the sect’s everyday communal or religious 
practices. Over the past decades, the number of people who have visited Menzil village and 
“repented” (tevbe almak) is most likely a seven-digit number. According to nonverified data, 
the village receives up to 500,000 guests every year (Yalniz, 2006, November 16).
The spiritual genealogy of Menzil sheikhs can be traced to the influential Sufi authority 
Khalid Baghdadi (d. 1827), the renewalist of the tarikat founded by Bahauddin Naqshband 
(d. 1389), and further back to Companion of the Prophet Abu Bakr and to Muhammad him-
self (Hatme-i hacegan…, 1998). From Baghdadi, the ĳaza (permission) for the Tarikat leader-
ship was passed through his students to the famous Sufi Sibgatullah Arvasi (d. 1870) and his 
caliph Abdullah Taha, who lived in Bitlis, an Eastern Anatolia region. During World War I, 
the family of Taha’s disciple Mohammed Ziyauddin fought on the Eastern Front. In this war, 
Ziyauddin lost his two brothers and a hand, but his courage was appreciated by Atatürk him-
self (Baz, 2014).
It was Ahmed Haznevi, who lived in Syria near the Turkish border and was the succes-
sor of Ziyauddin (d. 1924), from whom Abdulhakim Huseyni, the founder and father of the 
current and previous community leaders, received his ĳaza. In his declining years, Huseyni 
bought a large plot of land in the Menzil village (the current official name is Durak2) and 
settled there. He died in 1972, leaving the post of sheikh to his son, Muhammed Rashit Erol 
(born in 1930 in Baykan, Siirt Province), under whom an inconspicuous village in a dis-
tant province acquired extreme popularity (Kara, 2003). The sheikh, known for his ancestry 
(apart from the Sufi component, his family is believed to be descendants of the Prophet) 
and devoutness, began to attract visitors, which mainly comprised small business representa-
tives, lower and middle managers, and members of their families from all over Turkey. Many 
alcoholics, gamblers, and criminals came and were often cured of their addictions. Although 
some believe M. R. Erol to be the founder of the Menzil Jama’at (Menzil cemaati. In Wiki-
pedia), Seyda Hazretleri, or the godly descendant of the Prophet as his followers call him, 
has continued work of his father Abdulhakim. Stressing the importance of working with the 
general public, Huseyni said:
 Tarikats that used to be schools for cultivating evliya (Friends of the Almighty), 
have now become the schools for faith salvation...People used to travel for years 
looking for a sheikh...While now one must walk from door to door...[it is] not the 
time of the Tarikat, the goal is to save the faith....[Çakır, 2012, p. 70].
However, unlike his father, M. R. Erol emphasized the Sufi component, creating a unique 
synthesis of missionary work, folk healing, and mysticism. He himself denied giving away any 
healing grace (“You’d think the healing is in my pocket so that I could give it away?” [Çakır, 
2012, p. 72]); however, he attracted the ill and disabled people, people who were childless, 
and people suffering from drug addictions of all kinds. Legends about his supernatural abili-
ties followed him.
After the military coup of 1980, an ever-increasing flow of visitors to Menzil village raised 
flags to the authorities, and in 1983, M. Erol was sent into exile to the west on the Gokcheada 
2. Both durak (Turkish) and menzil (Arabic) denote more or less the same — an encampment, stop, or point of arrival. In the 
era of Kemalism, many words and names that had Arabic roots were replaced with Turkish words or new words were 
invented based on Turkish roots.
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Island in Chanakkale Province. Three years later, as a personal request from Prime Minister 
Turgut Özal to President (and the leader of the group that staged the coup d’état in 1980) 
Kenan Evren, M. R. Erol was allowed to return to Menzil (Özcan, 2016). In 1991, the sheikh of 
the jama’at was attacked by his namesake, a 17-year-old Murat Erol from Denizli, who man-
aged to stick a needle laced with poison at a hand-kissing ceremony during Ramadan. The 
criminal almost got lynched but was rescued (according to some reports by plain-clothes po-
lice officers who were surprisingly close at the time of the incident). Later, Murat explained 
that the reason for his actions stemmed from his belief that the sheikh was an “enemy of 
Islam,” (Konuralp, 2006, October 25) but the facts of the event remain dubious. The sheikh 
survived, but the poison seemed to have undermined his already fragile health. He passed 
away two years later. Since then, the jama’at has been headed by Abdulbaki Erol, his younger 
brother (from Huseyni’s second wife), whom his disciples reverently call “Gavs-i Sani” — that 
is, “second” after father “Gavs,” or the “Assistant [in spiritual matters]” (“Big Gavs” was how 
Abdul Qadir Jilani [d. 1166], one of the most famous Sufis of all time and the founder of Tari-
kat Qadiriyyah, was called.) 
SUFISM IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
S ufism was a widespread phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire and was in fact a Turkish form of Islam that influenced all social strata of the Ottoman state. Apart from the Sufi brotherhoods’ huge number of followers among the ordinary subjects of the 
sultan, many late Osman ulama and Sheikh-ul-Islams were also close to the Sufis, especially 
to the Khalidiya branch of the Naqshbandiyya, to which Menzil also belonged. Sufi leaders 
performed a kind of a feedback function between the court and the people, while the Islamic 
authorities legitimized the religion of the lower and middle strata (Şeker, 2007). In the 
republican period, Atatürk tried to level out the Islamic factor, and although his actions were 
considered successful at the state level and in the public sphere, the situation was different 
at the grassroots level. The Sufi brotherhoods (i.e., the tarikats, especially of the Naqshbandi 
nature) perceived the persecution as something inevitable and continued their activities 
despite the new conditions, which officially declared them as illegal.
Ismail Kara (2010), the Turkish Islamic scholar, summarized the Sufis’ and dervishes’ reac-
tion to these actions as follows (p. 155):
1. Tekkes [Sufi educational institutions] cannot be closed. It is not the same as closing 
some buildings or dwellings. Because the whole world is a tekke. This profession has 
no need for crowns, clothes, formality.
2. Living in tasavvuf [same as Sufism] is a natural human need. Therefore, it will 
be satisfied in various ways.
3. Tasavvuf is the education of the soul. It does not need tekke. Education is passed 
from soul to soul.
4. The government has done what it considers to be right. There is a (secret) 
meaning in everything that the government does. One of the names of Allah is 
‘Hakim’ (Ruler) and is manifested in the government (‘hukumet’ in Turkish is 
derived from ‘hakim’).




6. This is fate. There is no countering it. It is like holding a paddle against the 
stream.
7. Anything and everything is a manifestation of Allah’s names. Both His mercy 
and His wrath are good.
8. The tekkes were as good as closed because they could not be renewed.
9. The closure of the tekkes has not affected any religious foundation. On the 
contrary, we are going back to the basics. There were no tekkes in the time of the 
Holy Prophet.
10. From now on, our time is not that of Tarikats.
The sultanate as a form of the Muslim regime ceased to exist, and Sufis came to terms with 
it. Their activities, however, with the exception of rare personalities and periods, had little 
to do with politics (except for the Mevlevi brotherhood); therefore, the Sufis were quick to 
adopt the secular nature of the new republic and were very eager to adapt to the new condi-
tions.
The new policy in the public sphere, as well as in education, culture, and so forth, deeply 
affected the Sufis themselves, who had to adapt to the new conditions in order to influence 
society. Republican authorities as good as forced them to be more rational, economically ori-
ented, and urbanized, and to use all the tools of the new Turkish state and society (Mardin et 
al., 2012). The transition from the empire and traditional society to the modern national state 
played a key role in this process. Many traditional formations, including Sufi tarikats that, in 
the time of the Ottoman, had existed in relative integrity, were forced to rebuild themselves 
in the new conditions when community activities, which in the premodern societies had 
been done in a single institutional context, became “dispersed between various institutions” 
(Berger, 2012, p.11). Thus, the Sufis became neo-Sufis, and the tarikats became jama’ats.
By removing the institution of official Islamic clerics, the Kemalists prompted wider sec-
tions of the population to rethink religion and ensured the spread of religious authority 
among various Muslim leaders, most of whom received recognition solely because of their 
personal merits or charisma. In addition, the fact that many official Muslim leaders, even 
those far from Sufism, had gone underground caused an unprecedented increase in the 
quality of education in secret madrasahs and tekkes (Sarıkaya, 2000). The Sufis, in a society 
where Islam was the common denominator, turned out to be the most enduring and self-
organized group of Muslims, and gradually almost all Islamic activities in Turkey (except for 
the State Administration for Religious Affairs) became concentrated around particular Sufi 
authorities. The Naqshbandi network remained and spread even during the toughest years 
of repression.
Although the main goal of the Sufi tarikats under the Muslim regime was to ensure the 
spiritual growth and improvement of Muslims (who, except for representatives of other mil-
lets, officially were considered as subjects in the Ottoman Empire), their main mission in 
the age of laicism was to “save the faith” (i.e., to increase the steadily shrinking number of 
observant Muslims). A decrease in the number of so-called formal Muslims and an increase 
in the number of followers of various jama’ats were two tendencies in Turkey since the 1920s.
Atatürk and his associates banned tarikats in 1925 and generally introduced a French-
style laical hostility to religion in the public sphere. (We will not go into the motives and 
reasons for this policy.) At times, the level of aggression reached what Berger (2012) denoted 
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the third type of secularism, which was encountered, for example, in the U.S.S.R. (Berger, 
2012), but this was more of an exception. People were not forbidden from being practic-
ing believers, but they were viewed as second-rate people and many social elevators were 
closed a priori for them. Muslims openly reading zikr or gathering in numbers more than 10 
(not to mention hundreds or thousands) in a certain place was out of question at the time. 
However, these oppressive norms against Muslims were one of the factors that led to the 
defeat of the Turkish Republican People’s Party at the very first alternative elections in 1950. 
Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party substantially eased the pressure on Islam, and 
Turkish jama’ats with strong internal dynamics had long been waiting for this opportunity 
(Zarcone, 1993). They created what Şerif Mardin, the famous Turkish scholar, called a kind of 
a “synthesis of religious and economic life” (Mardin et al., 2012, pp. 102–103). Moreover, the 
jama’ats served as a force that helped the Muslims modernize and not feel alienated in the 
new reality. Using Roy’s (2013) hypothesis, I can argue that in fact Muslim communities (and 
Islamist parties) have even secularized Muslims on some level by automatically accepting the 
legitimacy of the Turkish national state with laicism as one of its pillars. 
The military coup of 1980 was stacked against the violence and chaos of the late 1970s 
that the country was plunged into but that were primarily against the communist and leftist 
movements in general, including the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Despite the general 
negative attitude toward Islam, the Turkish political and military elite began to accept the 
fact that religion could not be ignored and that to deny it access to legal means of political 
representation was dangerous. In addition, Turgut Özal, who, despite his secular lifestyle, 
performed namaz and was close to Sufi circles, and his Muslim-tolerant Motherland Party 
unexpectedly (and counter to the wishes of coupists with their own party) won the first 
election after the coup (Uturgauri & Ulchenko, 2009). His successful economic reforms and 
economic liberalization, among other things, caused the rapid development of the Anatolian 
hinterland and the growth of the notorious “green capital” owned by the conservative bour-
geoisie. 
KURDISH JAMA’AT OF THE TURKISH NATIONALISTS 
I n this context, politicians’ interest in Menzil village is not surprising because it (a) attracted hundreds of thousands of pilgrims; (b) is located in the east (i.e., in the areas densely populated by Kurds); (c) has a community led by Kurds (albeit with 
the legendary descent from the Prophet); and (d) adheres to Islamic dogmas with no 
differentiation of nationalities but still holds respect for the general Turkish nation. In the 
1970s, the emergence of the National Action Party (NAP) began a cautious rapprochement 
of the Turkish nationalistic ideology that had been critical of religion in general with Islam 
coming out into the open. Islamic jama’ats in eastern Turkey may not have been fostering 
ideal citizens for the Kemalists, but they were nevertheless the lesser evil compared to 
communism and especially Kurdish terrorism and, eventually, a homegrown evil that 
was easier to co-opt than to destroy. Perhaps that is why in the 1970s and 1980s, Turkish 
nationalists took interest in Menzil village and its inhabitants the neo-Sufis, who were 
loyal to the state and combined the Naqshbandi traditions, Turkish identity, and Sunnism 
(Öztürk, 2009). There were rumors that none other than Alparslan Türkeş, the creator and 
leader of the NAP, was a follower of M. Erol (Bacaksız, 2012, October 31). This was most 
likely not true, but the fact remains that the nationalists tried to “play” in the Islamic field 
and attract the electorate that was the object of keen interest of political Islam parties. In 
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the 1970s and 1980s, many nationalists, the Ülkücü, became Menzil followers. In 1993, 
a pro-Islamic group within the NAP led by Muhsin Yazicioglu (served a 6-year-term in 
prison after the 1980 coup) broke away from the party and started a Turk-Islamic synthesis 
experiment at the party level. He often spoke with the leaders of Menzil and other jama’ats, 
clearly counting on electoral support. According to some sources, Menzil did support him 
(Atay, 2015, May 28), but Yazicioglu failed to make great progress3. His Great Unity Party 
(GUP) consistently attracted 300,000 to 500,000 votes, but it is difficult to say how many of 
them had visited Menzil village. The Adiyaman Province also could not show a large percent 
of votes for the GUP. Considering that throughout the last decade, Menzil almost openly 
supported the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP; see below for more details), but 
the GUP managed to secure nearly as much votes (and even more on municipal elections). 
We can assume that the electoral effect from Yazicioglu and his party’s proximity to Menzil 
was definitely not decisive.
It can be argued that the succession of sheikhs from the Erol family has been politically 
oriented toward the pro-Muslim parties with a nationalistic rhetoric advocating a liberal 
economy and support for small businesses. According to Akyeshilmen and Özcan (2014), 
Turkish researchers from Selchuk University, Menzil supported the NAP from 1973 to 1977; 
the Islamists (i.e., the National Salvation Party later succeeded by the Welfare Party), along 
with the NAP, in 1977 and from 1987 to 1995; Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party in 1983 (na-
tionalists and Islamists were banned at the time); and Yazicioglu’s GUP from 1995 to 2002. 
From 2002 to the present day, the jama’at has been the electoral base of the ruling JDP, and 
from that point on, the political model of the state’s interaction with the jama’at began to 
change.
THE “ENCOMPASSMENT OF NAQSHBANDISM”  
BY THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY
T he founders of the JDP4 came from Islamist parties that succeeded each other after the bans but remained united by the brand of the National View movement and its leader Necmettin Erbakan. After the Virtue Party was banned in 2001, the schism that had long 
been brewing among the Islamists was finally formalized, and most politicians and members 
of parliament switched to the new JDP, while others remained with Erbakan, who founded 
the Happiness Party. The JDP made a clean sweep of the Islamist slogans and declared a new 
goal of democratization in Turkey. However, they understood full well that in a country with 
a centuries-old Muslim tradition and the overwhelming majority of Islam, democratization 
would inevitably bring the Muslims and Islam to the forefront (Çakır, 1994, May 14) and 
economic liberalization would allow the Anatolian hinterland to access the markets. By 
successful application of political technologies and global economic environment, the JDP 
conducted a series of reforms that dramatically increased the country’s GDP and brought it 
closer to the Copenhagen criteria for joining the EU.
The JDP gradually overcame the intolerance of the state and bureaucracy toward Mus-
lims and legitimized the presence of Islam in the public sphere. It can be said that Turkey in 
the 2000s switched from the French model of aggressive laicism to Anglo-Saxon pluralistic 
secularism. Turkish jama’ats have evolved from being the undesirables to becoming the active 
3. Yazicioglu died in a helicopter crash in 2009 with several colleagues, the circumstances of the death are still not clear.
4. Many founding fathers are no longer in official lists since they were blotted out after falling out of favor with Turkish 
President Recep Erdogan.
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participants of social and political processes. The JDP attracted the supporters of Muslim 
neo-Sufi communities to its side on three levels.
Personal level — the electorate. Through its rhetoric, campaign promises, adoption of 
laws (e.g., lifting the ban on head scarves in state offices), as well as party leaders’ demon-
strations of their “muslimness”, which worked both in the 1950s and in the 1980s and con-
tinues to serve its purpose in the 21st century, the JDP managed to ride the wave of Muslim 
ressentiment.
Collective level — cooperation and trade. Apart from the fact that, since 2002, the bar-
riers to Muslims’ employment in state bodies have been removed, the JDP began to system-
atically fill the vacancies with people from various communities (e.g., followers of Iskender 
Pasha5, followers of Gülen, Erenköy, etc6). Menzil also participated in this bargaining, with 
particular focus on the health sector (Aksaç, 2016, November 11). Officials periodically reject 
the reasonable suspicion that representatives of Muslim communities were co-opting into 
bureaucracy and politics (Çelik, H. 2012, February 20; Akdag, 2016, December 13), but de 
facto everything was different. Many observers discussed the replacement of F. Gülen’s staff7 
with that of Menzil (Gülen Cemaati yerine…, 2016, August 17); some wondered if the Menzils 
would be removed in the same way in the future (Aral, 2016, November 16).
Political level — oath. Since around 2007 or 2008, Erdogan began to consolidate power in 
the hands of one person, pinpointing on the image of a Muslim leader chosen as an ideologi-
cal framework for the process (Saetov, 2015, November 10). In this context, any alternative 
Muslim authorities became competitors in the electoral field, in society, and in state bodies. 
Therefore, they eventually had to either become completely loyal, which in Muslim terms 
means to take the oath of allegiance (biat etmek), or be marginalized until complete elimi-
nation. This approach is fully in line with the Kemalist methods of the single-party period, 
the only difference being that to join the elite, one would have to reject public observance 
of Islam. However, now the opposite is true and, figuratively speaking, beards are in fashion, 
but the state is nonetheless intolerant to alternative opinions. Some communities, includ-
ing Menzil, have agreed even to this level of cooperation. Two notable things are that the 
top public officials including Erdogan attended the opening, for example, of Menzil’s jama’at 
hospitals (Erdoğan’ın EMSEY hastanesi…, 2012, May 29) and that the associations of jama’at 
businessmen express open support for the authorities.
The main question remains — what will happen to neo-Sufi jama’ats if such a policy con-
tinues for an extended period of time? Mardin (2012) believed that the JDP had “encom-
passed the Naqshbandism” and that this was “the success of Kemalism” (P. 44), and I tend to 
agree with them. Despite a period of aggressive secularism, the jama’ats managed to subsist 
and develop due to several factors: The main one being the desire to preserve the Islamic 
faith in the absence of state support and, moreover, with the authorities’ negative attitude 
toward religion. The jama’ats proceeded from the premise of “who if not us” and underwent 
strong reformation, a transformation into a form that suited the political and social environ-
5. Initially, this jama’at had close ties with Erbakan, and many politicians were the followers of Sheikh Mehmet Zahid Kotku 
and his successor Esad Coshan.
6. In an interview with H. (43 years old): “The state offered no jobs in this municipality until the lists with names were 
received from jama’ats. Fethullahists sent them immediately, they had a lot of trained personnel, while with the others 
it sometimes took months”. Interview by I.Saetov.
7. The conflict between Erdogan and Gülen officially started in the fall of 2013 and has now reached its peak. Tens of 
thousands of people suspected in supporting Gülen have been arrested, and more than one hundred thousand have 
been fired. After the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, the Turkish authorities blamed it to F. Gülen. By default, all his 
supporters are suspected of terrorism. Gülen himself bluntly denies the charges.
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ment. Once the environment changed — namely, when Islam was released into the public 
space and the bans for the Muslims to be represented in all spheres of Turkish society were 
lifted — the jama’ats lost their initiative. The JDP encompassed its mission in its strategic 
discourse and absorbed it institutionally; the matter of “saving the faith” took second place 
because there was no obvious oppression (although the electorate was still frightened of the 
Kemalists before the elections and the number of observant Muslims is decreasing slowly but 
steadily). The communities are now faced with a choice: to reformulate their goals and ob-
jectives or their essence in general or to dissolve into the JDP’s electorate, party organs, and 
institutions. In my opinion, if the current political conditions remain unchanged, the return 
of the Jama’ats to ‘tarikatism’ and their complete depoliticization, their orientation toward 
the spiritual realm, and their focus on self-improvement and individual search for God seem 
plausible. This would allow the opposition to survive, as Erdogan’s main concern is public 
disloyalty that can affect the electorate. For the loyal neo-Sufis, this would be a way to avoid 
reflection on the essence of modern power, assessment of politics, and analysis of the moral 
aspects of cooperation with politicians. Active religious and social efforts will remain the 
prerogative of state bodies, primarily the Office for Religious Affairs and its related structures, 
which are likely to lead to religious emasculation and formalization. If neo-Sufis “return” to 
more mystical forms, then such neo-tarikats will be very different from past normative mod-
els, which will already be a new phenomenon in the postsecularism era. In this era, we will 
speak of zikrs via video messengers, work with augmented reality, fast with the use of pills 
produced by nanotechnologies, engage in Sufi art therapy, and so on.
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